The threat of armed insurrection or mutiny against Vladimir Putin and his military leaders exploded into life on June 23, 2023, and ended the next day as suddenly and dramatically as it had begun. It was not unexpected. There had been worrying indications of discontent among the ranks of the Wagner Group, and the international press had talked of a “half-hearted insurrection,”[1] the effects of which for the Kremlin chief, politically and militarily, are considerable. In this article we will reconstruct the affair on the basis of reports from the international press, which are sometimes contradictory or not fully verified. It should also be noted that it is not easy to reconstruct the facts or reach political or strategic evaluations while everything is still in flux and where sometimes the fake news that is spread online is taken for proven truth. Time will give us a more accurate understanding of what happened.
What has been verified is now well known. We will, however, offer a brief summary. On the morning of June 23, Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the mercenary group Wagner (consisting of about 25,000 militiamen), embarked on what appeared to be a march on Russia’s capital after posting very aggressive messages on the social network, Telegram. After months of complaints on social media, in which he had pointedly criticized the leaders of the Russian army – Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Russian Army Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov – regarding the progress of military operations in the battle for Bakhmut,[2] Progozhin set out on what was seemingly a rebellion. The trigger appears to have been the Defense Minister’s order, at Putin’s request, for all the private militias present in the various theaters of war to sign, by July 1, 2023, an act of submission to the authority of the Russian commanders.[3]
On June 24, Prigozhin, with a contingent of about 5,000 men, reached Rostov-on-Don, Russia’s ninth most populous city, home to the command center for the military operations in Ukraine. They surrounded this nerve center of military power. The Russian army leaders, taken by surprise, responded in a haphazard manner. Meanwhile, the internal security services (FSB) announced that it had opened criminal proceedings against the head of Wagner, accusing him of organizing an armed insurrection. Intelligence reported that the Russian high command had been aware of Prigozhin’s plans for days, but did not clarify what they were.[4]
The rebels with their armored vehicles, cheered on by crowds thronging the roadsides, decided to leave Rostov and, without encountering any resistance whatsoever, headed toward Moscow. At the town of Voronezh, about 200 kilometers from the capital, Prigozhin stopped his march on Moscow. The coup attempt, if this was what it was, failed, although its effects were devastating, especially for the morale of the army on the Ukraine front.[5]
After frantic negotiations, carried out through the mediation of Belarusian President Lukashenko, an agreement was reached, meaning that Prigozhin and those who wanted to follow him could go to Belarus. The others were to return to the front in Ukraine. In short, Prigozhin and the Wagner rebel forces would get immunity in exchange for exile in Belarus, although many analysts point out that Putin does not usually pardon his political opponents.[6]
After these events, and after a few days of silence, on June 26 Putin addressed the nation through State TV, asserting in a peremptory tone, “From the very beginning all decisions were immediately taken to neutralize the threat.”[7] Thus he responded to those who had criticized the absence of the Russian armed forces in the first stage of the “coup.” In his short speech, Putin never mentions Prigozhin, but he lashes out at those who, so he claims, are trying to “divide and weaken the country,” accusing them of treason and plotting so that “Russian soldiers will kill each other.”[8] He also stated that he would never allow Russia to sink into revolution and chaos, as had happened in 1917.
In fact, Prigozhin’s plan was in plain sight in the messages communicated via Telegram. The latest one, dated June 24, was highly critical of Putin’s so-called “special operation,” deeming it specious and false.[9] The Russian leaders, he wrote, had led the country to war for reasons based on corruption and vainglory, and the Ukrainians had in no way given any grounds for an attack on them. He also claimed that Ukrainian forces were advancing, contradicting Russian propaganda, and that more Russian soldiers had died on the battlefield than Ukrainians. Politically calculating, he was careful to say in his communication that this was not a coup. In his previous messages he had attacked the army leadership, but never explicitly Putin. These, in brief, were the reasons why he had acted during those few days.
How is it that a man, ambitious and shrewd as Prigozhin, whose career both as an oligarch – although starting out as a hot dog seller – and as head of Wagner, was due entirely to Putin’s protection, had decided to march against his benefactor at a very sensitive moment in the military campaign, discrediting him, albeit indirectly, in the eyes of his people? According to some analysts,[10] when he realized that the Kremlin chief was about to disown him, by subjecting his militia to the command of the Defense Ministry, Prigozhin started a communication campaign that eventually turned into political activity. In fact, his messages contain all the elements of a radical populist movement, the centerpiece of which is the view that the political and military elite is the cause of the army’s problems and possible military defeat. According to Prigozhin, authoritarian methods are the only ones that will work in the current situation. Therefore, it would be appropriate, in his opinion, to declare general mobilization as soon as possible and introduce a planned war economy. This is what Putin had been unwilling to do in a year and a half of war for political and domestic reasons.
In any case, Wagner’s chief presented himself with his messages to the Russian public as a political leader on a par with opponent Alexei Navalny, even though he was not aiming, at least overtly, to “dethrone” Putin, but to secure his own political influence or secure his own business interests. “Had it not been for this publicity campaign,” says a Meduza journalist, “Prigozhin would most likely have already been eliminated by the Kremlin, killed, silenced or put behind bars.”[11] If this analysis is accurate, the head of Wagner would have to be credited with uncommon political foresight. Although it does not seem likely that Prigozhin embarked on his “march on Moscow” without having had quite a few means of protection both in the political and economic spheres provided by Putin’s now war-weary oligarchs and members of the military, this protection or connivance would eventually be withdrawn for reasons we do not yet know.[12]
Meanwhile, Russian authorities have already begun dismantling the many Wagner-related businesses, including the Patriot publishing group, which controls several publications and news sites, as well as “troll factories” accused of trying to interfere in presidential elections in the U.S. and several European countries. It also appears that Wagner’s recruitment offices in Russia are still active and offer job opportunities in Ukraine, preceded by three weeks of training.[13]
Unexpectedly, on June 29, six days after the coup, according to rumors circulated by the French newspaper Libération, later confirmed by an official statement from the Russian presidential spokesman, Putin reportedly met with Prigozhin and a delegation of 35 Wagner commanders at the Kremlin. After three hours of discussion, the president gave his assessment of the company’s actions. He listened to the commanders’ explanations and offered them alternatives for their future participation in combat.[14] Apparently, the Kremlin thought that Wagner’s chief could still be useful, albeit with reduced powers. The commanders, for their part, stressed “that they are soldiers who are staunch supporters of the head of state and are ready to fight for the homeland.”[15] In any case, the official announcement still leaves open questions about the future of the Wagner leader (who is probably in Russia) and the fate of his fighters, who never arrived at the camps offered by Minsk, as first announced.
The national media in those same days continued to discredit Prigozhin in many ways. State TV stated, “He is certainly not the Robin Hood he claims to be. He was a fixer with a criminal past, and many of his projects were shady and not always within the law.” And again, “We are talking about an enriched thug who suddenly decided to become a traitor to his country.”[16] Harsh words heard by millions of viewers.
The “crisis” is not fully resolved, and the showdown between those involved has only been postponed.
As we have said, the Wagnerian March on Moscow left many Western governments apprehensive. On June 26, U.S. President Joe Biden bluntly declared his country’s and NATO’s ignorance of what was happening in Russia. “We have made it clear,” the president said, “that we are not involved. We have nothing to do with this. It is part of the struggle within the Russian system.”[17] One can well understand why Biden has no interest in providing Putin with reasons to accuse the West of plotting against him in order to avoid reprisals with the use of nuclear weapons, but also to silence Russian propaganda that the invasion of Ukraine is actually a proxy war between Washington and Moscow. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby later added that “regime change in Russia is not part of U.S. policy.”[18] He also revealed that as Wagner marched on Moscow, Western governments “evaluated several possible scenarios.” He did not specify which ones, however, but it is possible that the discussion centered on the fate of the 6,000 nuclear warheads on Russian soil, as well as a possibly irresponsible military reaction by Putin. These concerns are also shared by China, which is also interested in keeping the nuclear potential of its uneasy ally in check.
It should not be forgotten that the U.S., as well as certain NATO countries, do not desire the implosion of Putin’s Russia at this time, because this would create chaos in the heart of the Eurasian continent, and ultimately would favor China, the real strategic opponent of the U.S, leading to a possible invasion of Siberia. In other words, Washington wants only the military and political weakening of Putin, but not for Russia to become a global security problem. Apparently Biden has also convinced President Zelensky not to escalate matters by taking advantage of the situation. Meanwhile, Russian artillery has continued to pound civilian buildings in Ukraine during and after the Prigozhin affair, killing innocent civilians.
The history of Wagner’s origin and development is rather nebulous. It is a company that the Kremlin has never formally recognized as its affiliate and, in fact, would not even be legal in Russia, since the Russian Criminal Code has banned private military units for decades. However, it is a paramilitary entity that intervenes in theaters of war – first and foremost Ukraine – and in countries where Moscow’s armies are present.[19] For the first time, at least in the international press, there is mention of this private company – whose militiamen were among the so-called “little green men,” sporting unmarked uniforms and serving alongside Crimean pro-Russians – since 2014, at the time of Moscow’s invasion of Crimea. It seems that the project of creating a non-state militia, free of hierarchical constraints, modeled on the paramilitary militias operating in various African countries, was previously considered by Moscow’s intelligence services with Putin’s consent. Subsequently, its management was committed to a man trusted by the Kremlin, somewhat outside the power structure, a man commonly known as “Putin’s cook,” namely, Prigozhin, who is personally linked to the president.
Specialists on the subject believe that Wagner is not a traditional private military company, but “an extension of the Russian state,” created for the specific purpose of conducting sensitive, i.e., nefarious business on behalf of the Kremlin at times when a convenient cover was deemed necessary.[20] For years these mercenaries, in addition to waging war in various countries, have also been dedicated to business operations. In fact, the Wagner Group, through complicated economic dealings, finances itself, and its leaders enrich themselves, with Moscow’s blessing. According to a report by the Soufar Center, Wagner is allegedly involved in a number of illicit activities that go far beyond security services. The group also faces sanctions from the U.S. and other countries, “due to a web of investments made in places like Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic, whereby billions of dollars have allegedly been moved from Sudan to the United Arab Emirates through a network of financial instruments that managed to evade sanctions.”[21]
Shortly after the Russian attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the bulk of its contingent – about 25,000 men – was used to fight Ukrainian forces in the toughest theaters of war, such as the Bakhmut “meat grinder.” Prigozhin’s rebellion against Russian army commanders and the failed “march on Moscow” dealt the death blow to the paramilitary organization. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, soon after the events, announced, rather confusingly, the dissolution of the Wagner group and its absorption into the regular Russian army, but did not mention that the company has been divided into two major sections: one dealing with the war in Ukraine, and one present in Africa and the Middle East. The latter, in addition to waging war, is engaged in lucrative economic enterprises, from controlling gold mines in Sudan to trading in precious wood elsewhere.
Now, those who join Wagner usually do so not only for economic reasons but also, taking an oath to their leaders, to feel a sense of invincibility and instill fear in others. According to some interpreters, it seems unlikely that many of these affiliates will join the ranks of the regular Russian army, which consists mostly of young soldiers with little experience and little motivation. But for the moment it is not possible to predict precisely what will happen. There are not a few Russian officers who would like to see the complete demobilization of this paramilitary organization. On the other hand, the head of the Duma Defense Committee, Andrej Kartapolov, has stated that Wagner should not be disbanded because it is the most efficient unit on the front, and its end would be a gift to NATO and the Ukrainians.
The fact remains that if the Defense Ministry wants to “domesticate” Wagner’s mercenaries, who are considered useful on the battlefield and competent in operating weapons, it must consider that there are three different types of affiliation in the organization.[22] First, the so-called “specialists,” who are present abroad and are in charge of managing affairs in order to subsidize the organization’s activities and also to train new recruits. Their number is secret, but it does not appear to be more than 5,000. Second, there are the “veterans,” who make up the bulk of Wagner’s operational units engaged in combat operations in Ukraine. These are very well-trained militias used in operations that require experience and courage. Finally, there is the recently added “manpower.” These are mostly former prison inmates who enlisted with the hope of returning to freedom in exchange for six months of service. Most of these enlistees fought for nine months in Bakhmut, sacrificing their lives for a cause that probably did not touch them personally. Certainly they are the ones most easily assimilated into the regular army, in part because they fight simply for money or to avoid returning to prison.
After the alleged coup, the Wagnerians are expected to move from Russia to Belarus, where, according to some sources, they will help the local army in a possible escalation of the war, but without their heavy weapons which have been handed back to Moscow. This new relocation of the rebels has worried some NATO allies. Polish President Andrzej Duda said in this regard that the “repositioning” of Russian forces in Belarus is very bad for his country because the new military bases offered to Wagner are located not far from the Polish border. The governments of Lithuania and Latvia have also protested and asked NATO to strengthen their borders.[23]
It seems, however, that by now Wagner’s future will be played out mainly in Africa. Many believe that in Europe, despite Lukashenko’s readiness to welcome them to his country, the militia’s fate is sealed. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated that the mercenary group continues its “operations” in foreign countries where it has been sent. It is present in five African countries, as well as Syria and Libya where it controls important oil fields. According to The Economist, it is still unclear what is presently happening in those countries. In any case, even if Prigozhin were to be sidelined, the organization is unlikely to leave the African countries where it has a presence.
“Wagner is more than just one man and has a vested interest in staying put. Moreover, the Kremlin will be loath to lose a source of influence on the continent. Most probably Wagner will retreat from Africa only if Africans themselves start to see Russia as a weak and unreliable partner.”[24] Although it should be noted, the British journal continues, that Wagner is not a unitary organization, but consists – especially in Africa – of a network “of companies with ties to the Russian state, operating under contracts with individual governments. As with colonial enterprises of the 19th century, these deals allow the Kremlin to partake in foreign adventures with scant accountability.”[25]
When operating in an African country, such as Mali, the Central African Republic, or Sudan, the organization uses a business model that has three elements: the military, the economic, and the political. This mix varies in importance depending on the country: in some cases, when Moscow considers it strategically important, the political element prevails over the others, but usually it is the economic element that prevails. Violence against civilians, massacres of defenseless people, and rape are almost always occurring, to varying degrees, in these types of operations, regardless of their nature.
Many wonder what will happen to Wagner on the African continent. The question is no small one. If the Kremlin, after recent events, wanted to change the structure or purpose of its agreements with African states regarding the use of this organization, this would probably lead to the nationalization of the various groups that comprise it. Another option might be to rename the militia, introduce new leadership or move its holdings so that different elites have control. Regardless, it would seem illogical for Russia to unilaterally withdraw from initiatives that it has always found useful politically or strategically, and in any case economically fruitful.
Despite the events involving Wagner, the war has not stopped. Ukraine continues, albeit slowly, its counteroffensive, while Russian troops fall back and entrench themselves to resist assaults. “If the Ukrainian counteroffensive achieves good results and Russia realizes that it will not be able to break through on the battlefield without resorting to a massive recruitment campaign, at the risk of triggering protests, Putin may be willing to reach a deal.”[26] This would avoid the dreaded nuclear escalation of the conflict, and lead to some form of resolution, even if not in the immediate future. This assessment seems rather optimistic to us, but why not consider it?
After the events reported and the apparent normalcy that has followed the Wagner implosion, it would seem that nothing has in fact changed in Russia. Will this really continue to be the case?[27]
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32009/22072446.0923.2
[1]. Cf. P. Ivanova – A. Stognei, “Una rivolta a metà”, in Internazionale, June 30, 2023, 18; “Wagner rebels turn against Putin’s army”, in The Economist, June 25, 2023.
[2]. Where his mercenary company was engaged, succeeding, after nine months of carnage (more than 20,000 of his men apparently were killed), in taking the town, which many analysts say has no particular strategic value.
[3]. Creating volunteer militias on the Wagner model to fight in Ukraine has allowed Putin to recruit new forces without ordering a second unpopular mobilization. This move, however, is proving dangerous and detrimental to both the course of the war and the country’s future. According to the Ukrainian investigative (non-governmental) site Molfar, there are reportedly at least 37 private militias in Russia, all of them linked in some way to the Kremlin: some already disbanded, others emerging over the last twelve months of the war in Ukraine. They are often financed by oligarchs or state-owned companies that hope to curry favor with Putin in this way. Aside from Wagner, the most important militias, and also among the oldest in order of origin, is Redut (reportedly numbering about 7,000 volunteers) and Patriot, which reports to the Defense Ministry. The most recent include Potok, Fakel, Plamja, and others. Some of these are said to have been created or financed by Gazprom, the gas giant company, under the authorization of the central government. Cf. R. Castelletti, “Mosca fa mea culpa. Sciogliere le milizie private non è più un tabù”, in la Repubblica, July 1, 2023; E. Occorsio, “Wagner e gli altri. Le sporche guerre dei mercenari”, in L’Espresso, July 9, 2023, 44.
[4]. Cf. R. Castelletti, “Trattativa sui capi delle forze armate. La partita che decide il futuro di Putin”, in la Repubblica, June 26, 2023. Western intelligence sources believe they had intercepted by June 23 plans to revolt against the Kremlin.
[5]. In terms of military tactics, Wagner’s mutiny has divided and distracted the Russian army. In the trenches, its men know that while they are ordered to die for their country, Prigozhin has branded their leaders corrupt and indifferent to the fate of their soldiers. See “The meaning of Prigozhin’s short-lived mutiny”, in The Economist, June 25, 2003.
[6]. On July 3, “Putin’s cook,” as Prigozhin is called, released an audio message via Telegram in which he described his march as an attempt to fight traitors and mobilize Russian society, adding, “Soon you will see our next victories.” Five days later he “posted” yet another message, in which he defended, against attacks from the Russian press, his own militias. Cf. F. Dragosei, “Prigozhin se la prende con i media di Putin”, in Corriere della Sera, July 9, 2023.
[7]. Putin added that if the army did not intervene immediately, it was not out of complicity with the insurgents, but because it obeyed his directive to “avoid bloodshed,” and that the goal was to give an opportunity “to those who had made a mistake” to reconsider. Armed rebellion would have been suppressed” (R. Castelletti, “Con me o l’esilio: Putin implacabile sancisce la fine della Wagner”, in la Repubblica, June 27, 2023).
[8]. Ibid.
[9]. Cf. L. Caracciolo, “L’impero a rischio disintegrazione e l’occidente teme il pericolo nucleare”, in La Stampa, June 25, 2023.
[10]. Cf. M. Trodoljubov, “Un sistema di potere vulnerabile”, in Internazionale, June 30, 2023, 21.
[11]. Ibid., 22.
[12]. Cf. “The Wagner mutiny has left Putin dangerously exposed”, in The Economist, June 29, 2023.
[13]. Cf. “Russia: what happened to Prigozhin?”, ibid., July 7, 2023, 24.
[14]. Cf. R. Castelletti, “Russia, la telenovela Prigozhin continua. Il Cremlino: ‘Ha visto Putin il 29 giugno’”, in la Repubblica, July 11, 2023.
[15]. Ibid.
[16]. M. Imarisio, “Il mistero di Prigozhin. Cinque giorni dopo il golpe fu ricevuto da Putin”, in Corriere della Sera, July 11, 2023.
[17]. P. Mastrolilli, “Biden: affari interni, noi estranei. Ma la Casa Bianca teme un Putin debole”, in la Repubblica, June 27, 2023.
[18]. Ibid.
[19]. Cf. A. Magnani, “La Wagner tiene la capitale nel mirino e coltiva mire espansionistiche”, in Il Sole 24 Ore, June 25, 2023.
[20]. Cf. F. Mannocchi, “Wagner, i mercenari factotum dello Zar per espandere la sua influenza all’estero”, in La Stampa, June 27, 2023.
[21]. Ibid.
[22]. Cf. ibid.
[23]. Cf. ibid.
[24]. “The future of Wagner’s African empire?” in The Economist, June 27, 2023.
[25]. Ibid.
[26]. I. Brenner, “La ribellione ha svelato la vulnerabilità di Putin”, in Corriere della Sera, July 8, 2023.
[27]. Cf. ibid.
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