Recep Tayyip Erdogan won Turkey’s presidential election in the second round on May 28, 2023. It is his third such victory, this time with a majority of 52.1 percent of the vote.[1] It makes Erdogan the longest-serving leader in Turkish political history. The other candidate on the ballot, Kemal Kilicdaroglu,[2] received the other 47.8 percent of the vote, a result that cannot be overlooked on the national political level. “With this victory,” the president commented, “Turkey’s century has opened,”[3] referring to the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic, which will be celebrated on October 29.
The first round of elections had taken place on May 14, when the president had prevailed over his principal opponents, by about 4.5 percentage points, but without reaching the required 50 percent threshold. Parliamentary elections were held in association with the first round of voting, and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) was confirmed as the country’s leading political force, winning 268 seats out of 600, thus achieving a majority of 322 in coalition with two smaller nationalist parties. Fears of large-scale fraud proved unfounded in both the first and second rounds, and there were no significant incidents of violence at the polling stations.
Some institutional voices, mostly Western observers, have, however, denounced certain limitations during the electoral contest. The head of the delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, already in the aftermath of the May 14 elections, had said, “Turkish democracy is proving surprisingly robust. The elections saw a high turnout and offered citizens a real choice, even though the basic requirements of a fully democratic election were not there.”[4] He noted that important political and social figures are in prison despite the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, and “freedom of the press is severely restricted.”[5] This criticism was also shared by other European observers.
Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), of Kemalist origin, but converted in recent years into a modern, pro-Western social-democratic party. In order to defeat Erdogan, it had formed a grand coalition of six parties, supported by the pro-Kurdish party.[6] Until a few days before the vote, polls (observed by the pro-Western press) gave the alliance led by the “Turkish Gandhi” a clear advantage over Erdogan.[7] Predictions of his defeat did not come true.[8] After the runoff, Kilicdaroglu told his supporters, “Our march continues and we are here.”[9] He implied that the political action of the “coalition of six” could continue. Given its mixture of political aims, this seems improbable.
Undoubtedly, in Turkey these were the most important presidential and parliamentary elections and the most closely followed by the international press in recent times. In fact, they were a kind of referendum on the presidency of Erdogan, who has been in power for 20 years. This also explains the very high number of participants in the election race.[10] Erdogan had previously won five parliamentary elections, two presidential elections and three referendums; he had even survived a military coup. Only in recent times, because of the worsening economic crisis and the difficulties in managing the post-covid emergency, have polls begun to question the wisdom of re-electing him. The May 28 victory, although not a plebiscite, essentially confirmed him in his policy directions, especially in foreign policy. Certainly several aspects of economic management, the reception of migrants and, in general, domestic policy, which has been much criticized by the opposition will change. Erdogan cannot ignore the fact that almost half of the voters do not share his political vision and that he will no longer be, as in the past, “the one man in power.” He will have to deal with more organized and motivated political opposition and more critical pro-Western public opinion.
In recent times, Turkey has regained, on the international chessboard dominated by the opposition between the superpowers (the U.S. and China), a significant geopolitical centrality because of the war in Ukraine and the foreign policy adopted in the last decade by the president, aimed at reviving Turkey’s imperial legacy. In this regard, some interpreters speak of the “neo-Ottoman aspirations” of the Turkish leader in territories that were once dominated by the Ottoman sultan-caliph, namely, in Central Asia, North Africa and the Mediterranean. Erdogan’s recent re-election to the presidency of Turkey will further strengthen this policy direction, although his reappointment, barring unforeseen constitutional changes, will last only for another five years.
Turkey has become so significant again because it is a state that has an imperial concept of its role in history, which is clearly superior to its material resources. “Keeping this seeming contradiction in balance,” it has been said, “is the result of Erdogan’s skill. At least so far.”[11] Turkey’s geographic position (a natural bridge between the Mediterranean and Central Asia, between the Middle East and the Black Sea) makes it one of the most strategically important countries in its region, as it controls, economically and militarily, the Dardanelles Strait, and thus access to the Black Sea, although there are international treaties regulating shipping. This is also why its position on the current war in Ukraine is important. Turkey vigorously defends its interests in places where it has a presence, such as in Syria and Libya, but also in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.
The latest elections provide us with an opportunity to understand events both social and political that Turkey has experienced in recent times.
On February 6, 2023, two powerful earthquakes struck southern Turkey and northern Syria; thousands of buildings collapsed, burying families as they slept. This earthquake was much stronger and more destructive than the one that devastated Izmit (100 kilometers from Istanbul) in 1999, killing more than 18,000 people. Unfortunately, relief efforts experienced difficulties and were slow to respond to the challenge, at least at first, because of the poor condition of the roads and the vast extent of the affected area, which stretches along the Anatolian Fault for about 450 kilometers.[12] On February 9, the World Health Organization (WHO) said the death toll in the two regions could be as high as 20,000.[13] Many countries, including China and the U.S., have expressed their willingness to help Turkey so badly hit economically. Erdogan, also keeping in mind the proximity of the congressional and presidential elections, declined the aid offer, saying Turkey would go it alone. Considering the damage caused to buildings and civil infrastructure, in the long run, however, this refusal cannot be maintained. Turkey will need the help of many countries because of the critical phase it is going through in the economic-financial sphere, with inflation exceeding 40 percent.[14] Reconstruction, according to government estimates, is expected to cost more than $100 billion. “Since a large chunk of that money will have to come from Western countries, Erdogan has every reason to want to mend fences with investors and NATO allies.”[15]
Exactly one month after the earthquake, the president announced a new death toll of 46,104 in Turkey, adding to the more than 6,000 in Syria. Also, 230,000 buildings had collapsed or were declared uninhabitable, and many of them would have to be demolished immediately.[16] In short, this was a worse outcome than initially thought, although the numbers, for financial reasons, may have been inflated.
This natural event could have been disastrous for the ruling regime and could have had major political repercussions, distracting Turkey from its various objectives in the countries in which it is engaged. In fact, this was not the case. With the emergency phase over, although the problem of reconstruction remains, Erdogan has resumed managing domestic and international initiatives. The domestic front, at this stage, seems to have held up well for him, partly because the government has gone to great lengths to filter information both on the internet and in the media. The fact that areas affected by the earthquake include those where the Kurdish minority lives increases the risk that the earthquake, in the future, could fuel the fires of protest.[17]
Erdogan has been in power in Turkey for 20 years. In March 2003 he became prime minister after his AKP party won the election for the first time. Since August 2018, he has been president of the republic. At that time secularists feared that both he and his party had an overly Islamist political agenda and the election campaign reflected this. Such fears, however, soon proved to be exaggerated. In its early years, Erdogan’s government brought new economic stability to the country, introduced reforms in both economic and political matters and reduced the power that the armed forces had had in the past. In this regard, there was talk of a “revival of moderate Islam,” and many pointed to the new Turkey as the model for the Arab world to follow. Erdogan in those years had even adopted a policy of appeasement toward the Kurds, the country’s largest ethnic minority, about 10 percent of the population, who had long suffered persecution at the hands of the Turkish military and governments. In 2005 he began formal talks, which later proved too complex and inconclusive, for Turkey’s admission to the EU: it was the height of the new Turkish leader’s political fortunes in the international arena.
In any case, the longer Erdogan has been in power, the more autocratic he has become, centralizing the most important functions of the state on himself. Once elected president, he immediately transformed that previously formal role into a dominant, directive one, laying the groundwork for the creation of a presidential republic. After the failed coup of July 15, 2016, when members of the armed forces attempted to seize power by blocking bridges over the Bosporus, Erdogan began the long period of repression against his alleged enemies, the “Gulenists”[18] – once his political allies but now accused of organizing the coup – his political opponents, including magistrates and journalists, who, he believed, had sold out to the West. Since those years, tens of thousands have been purged from their positions and arrested. In acting thus, Erdogan has strengthened his position by dominating the system of institutional guarantees and the mass media. He then turned much of the media into agents of propaganda. He also purged his party by appointing his supporters to the highest offices.[19] Many important ministries, particularly economic ones, were given to members of his family. His power was put on display with the construction of a massive residence, the Kulliye Palace, with an attached mosque, on the outskirts of Ankara (1,100 rooms, spread over 300,000 square meters of space), four times the size of Buckingham Palace.
But what matters is not the breadth of power Erdogan enjoys but, as Lucio Caracciolo has written, “the ability to offer himself as a leader of both the Islamo-conservative masses of rural Anatolia and much of the Kemalist elite. On this “historical compromise” rests the Turkish ambition to ascend to the rank of a great power.”[20]
Indeed, in the area of the armed forces, the idea of contemporary Turkey as not only a land power but also a maritime power was born, the so-called “blue homeland policy.” This explains Erdogan’s interest in the Mediterranean, particularly in claiming the Aegean islands bordering its shores, which, however, belong to Greece, and establishing its control over all of the island of Cyprus,[21] the southern half of which has its own government recognized by the international community, and is part of the EU. Ankara’s future occupation of Tripolitania is also part of this strategy.[22] Paradoxically, Turkey, now present in Tripoli and on the sea, has become a country no longer distant from Italy but a neighbor with whom we need to reckon.
It should also be remembered that Erdogan considers himself a protector of the Sunni Muslim world, as the sultan-caliphs of Istanbul once had been. In any case, his membership of the Muslim Brotherhood is not as proudly claimed by him as it once was (hence his long-standing alliance with Qatar), not least because, after the defeats of the Arab Spring, the Brotherhood today is in crisis everywhere. However, this affiliation has not hindered him in establishing friendly and cooperative relations with Arab countries that had been hostile to the Brotherhood, such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Also significant was his rapprochement with Israel, but without disavowing ideological support for the Palestinian cause, to which many Islamists in Anatolia are attached.[23] Thus Erdogan presents himself to the Arab world, and also in other international contexts, as a realist, a politician ready to “do business with everyone.”
When it comes to domestic politics, the real Achilles’ heel of Erdogan’s strategy continues to be economic, particularly financial policy. The reckless cuts in interest rates (by more than 10 points from 2021) have, on the one hand, supported growth (GDP this year is reportedly 5 percent), albeit to a lesser extent than hoped for or real, but, on the other hand, have caused inflation to soar, which last fall had touched 85 percent. It has now stopped at 40 percent, according to official figures. Such a devalued currency has allowed a considerable increase in exports (USD254 billion). However, imports have risen to USD364 billion.[24] The fact remains that Turkey is importing expensive goods, such as weapons and new technology from Western countries to support the economy and modernize the country. But high inflation is holding back its growth, cutting the wages of the middle classes, condemning many to poverty and creating discontent among a section of the population, particularly those in populous cities.
To cater for the less advantaged social classes, Erdogan has taken hard-hitting and popular measures in recent months. He doubled the minimum wage by 50 percent, increased the lowest pensions and allowed millions of workers to retire early.[25] His government’s economic policy of increasing domestic consumption by lending at a low interest rate did not work and risked leading the country to collapse.[26] Indeed, the government has not acted effectively to keep prices of basic necessities under control in recent years. Consumer spending has increased by nearly 20 percent. During periods of high inflation, people often prefer to buy goods rather than wait for them to become more expensive.[27]
Socially, Turkey has undergone major changes in recent years, mainly because of the Middle Eastern wars fought on its borders. The country in total has nearly 85 million inhabitants, the vast majority of whom are Sunni Muslims. Anatolia has a large minority of Kurds (about 15 million), who have always been part of the nation but, because of their legitimate claims to greater autonomy, have often clashed with the central government. Some Kurdish parties have been outlawed because they were linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK, which is considered a terrorist organization by both Ankara and Western countries, and is not allowed to participate in elections.[28] But the social and demographic changes the country has undergone as a result of the war in Syria are unprecedented. Before the war, in 2010, Turkey had just 10,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Today it hosts 3.6 million Syrians, more than the whole of Europe, in addition to about a million migrants from several African and Central Asian countries.[29]
Only a small proportion of these refugees live in reception camps; the majority have scattered around the country, where (as in Europe) they work in illegal, low-paid jobs, without benefit of any form of social welfare. On several occasions, refugees have been used by the central government as a tool to pressure the EU for economic or political gains. In fact, if Ankara were not to police its shores or, worse yet, push them out, millions of migrants would try to enter Europe. To prevent this and block the so-called “Balkan route,” in 2017 Germany entered into an agreement with Turkey in which the latter pledged, in exchange for the promise of six billion euros (later to become eight), to block the transit of migrants toward Western Europe.
It is in foreign policy that Erdogan’s policies have achieved their greatest strategic-diplomatic victories in recent years. Turkey’s influence today extends from the Caucasus to Central Asia, while Russia’s has begun to recede. In 2023 Ankara forged diplomatic and trade relations with Israel[30] and with some major Arab oil-producing countries (notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Erdogan’s ambition, taking advantage of Western countries’ sanctions against Russia, is to make Turkey the hub of choice in fuel distribution for the entire Mediterranean, including EU countries, by using the pipelines that, through Anatolia, bring gas and oil from different regions, including Russia.
Turkey no longer recognizes itself as a satellite of Western foreign policy, but as an autonomous country with its own center of gravity and its own geostrategic interests. Membership of NATO provides it with a certain “insurance policy,” as well as some coverage in the nuclear sphere. Erdogan, however, has on several occasions sought to disengage from NATO’s directives. In November 2022, following a terrorist attack in Istanbul which cost six people their lives, attributed by the authorities to the Syrian Kurds of the PKK, he was on the verge of starting a new offensive against Syria, despite NATO’s opposition to a military operation.[31] Putin also rejected such an intervention, while affirming his readiness to enter into economic agreements with Ankara.[32] “We do not need to ask anyone’s permission,” Erdogan declared, “and we are not accountable to anyone,”[33] thus flatly reaffirming his country’s autonomy in the strategic sphere. Many in the Turkish president’s circle are convinced that the West at this moment is in decline and that a new international order, no longer centered on the U.S., is emerging. This is one of the reasons why Turkey has adopted a rather ambiguous policy on the war in Ukraine and maintains, despite Western sanctions, good relations with Russia.[34]
It should be noted that Turkey is partly dependent on Moscow economically and also strategically: 40 percent of its gas imports come from Russia. Moreover, in both the Caucasus and Libya the two regional powers have common interests, although they may fight on different fronts. But it is in relation to Syria that dealings between Moscow and Ankara have become closer and more necessary. In fact, without Putin’s consent, it would not have been possible to create the so-called “buffer zones” separating Turkey from Syrian territory, where the Kurds, allied with the U.S., are still fighting the last remnants of the Islamic State.[35]
The war in Ukraine, although Turkey formally sides with NATO, has not prompted the government in Ankara to distance itself from Moscow. In fact, Turkey has not enforced Western sanctions against Russia and recently said it does not recognize the International Criminal Court’s ruling that issued an arrest warrant against Putin. Ankara officials say that good relations with Russia allow Turkey to act as a mediator in Ukraine, facilitating possible negotiations between the parties. Indeed, in the first year of the war Erdogan has been among the most active supporters of the negotiating path, constantly keeping a channel of communication open with Putin. Indeed, Turkey should be thanked for the resumption of Ukrainian grain exports by sea, an agreement that was renewed, and a prisoner exchange between the warring parties.
Turkey, however, is very important to NATO, not least because of the size of its army. Turkish soldiers in the recent past have participated in many NATO missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. But recently Turkey has opposed NATO’s decisions to include Finland and Sweden in the coalition. Erdogan accuses them of harboring his enemies, namely members of the PKK and followers of Imam Fettullah Gülen. On March 17, Turkey agreed that Finland’s NATO admission process could begin. As for Sweden, however, nothing has been decided yet. Turkey hopes that its veto threat will eventually wrest from the U.S. Congress approval for the modernization package for the new F-16 fighter jets. In fact, the U.S. has already banned arming Turkey with the latest generation of aircraft since it purchased an air defense system (the S-400s) from Russia.
Turkey is also threatening to attack another NATO member, Greece, with which there has been an ongoing maritime rights dispute for years about Greek islands that lie not far from the Turkish coast. “We might even suddenly arrive one night”[36] and attack, Erdogan said last October. Moreover, the clash between Turkey and the south of Cyprus (where the north is occupied by Ankara), whose government is recognized by the international community, is still unresolved. In short, there are many open and unresolved issues that could trigger a war in the Mediterranean between Turkey and other countries belonging to NATO.
Finally, it should also be noted that it is not in Turkey’s interest to break with Western countries or leave NATO, and this is for both economic and strategic reasons.[37]
In the months immediately preceding the last elections, Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the Western powers, and the U.S. in particular, changed a great deal. First, it decided to enforce, even if only partially, sanctions against Russia, banning Russian ships from entering the straits, and thus sealing off the Black Sea.[38] Political observers argue that Turkey is both with and against everyone; that in the international arena it carries out a “Levantine” policy. Will Erdogan be able, in the coming years as head of state, to keep that position intact? Certainly, the historical phase we are going through allows it to pursue such a strategy, but until when? A never abandoned tenet of Turkish foreign policy is to choose “friendships” and one’s alliances on the basis of one’s own interests. But to what extent can a regional power such as Turkey, which is weak economically, do so? And at what cost? These crucial questions are not easy to answer.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32009/22072446.0723.10
[1]. Cf. M. Ricci Sargentini, “Erdogan vince ancora in Turchia: La famiglia è sacra, strangoleremo chiunque osi toccarla. Adesso il secolo turco”, in Corriere della Sera, May 29, 2023. In the first round of elections on May 14, 2023, Erdogan had won 49.5 percent of the vote, while Kilicdaroglu won 44.89 percent. Sinan Ogan’s ultranationalist party, opposed to the presence of Syrians in Turkey and fundamentally anti-Kurdish, had unexpectedly won 5.2 percent: cf. G. Stabile, “Turchia. Risveglio amaro”, in La Stampa, May 16, 2023. Prior to the runoff, Ogan urged his supporters to vote for Erdogan, thus helping the president achieve victory.
[2]. Kilicdaroglu, who belongs to the Alevi minority, which is considered by Sunnis to be unorthodox, promised during the election campaign to change many things: first of all in economic matters, reducing inflation, which has impoverished the country, raising interest rates and giving the Central Bank, in the hands of the president’s men, back its autonomy. He also said he would cancel the law on offenses against the Head of State under which many opponents and intellectuals were sent to prison, restore the autonomy of the judiciary, and restore to Parliament its own powers. In particular, he promised a return to the parliamentary system after years of the president’s dominance, He promised “a collegial government based on the relationship between checks and balances versus strongman leadership” (“La Turchia al bivio”, in Internazionale, May 12, 2023, 20). In the second round, his campaign skewed toward the nationalist front in order to win the votes of Ogan’s party but the move was unsuccessful.
[3]. G. Colarusso, “Erdogan vince ancora: ‘È il secolo della Turchia’. E attacca i diritti Lgbtq”, in la Repubblica, May 29, 2023.
[4]. A. Zaman, “L’inaffondabile Erdogan”, in Internazionale, May 19, 2023, 19.
[5]. Ibid.
[6]. The National Alliance is at its core a very heterogeneous coalition. In addition to the CHP, it includes nationalist-inspired parties, such as Meral Aksener’s Good Party, which in the past had been hostile toward the Kurds, and Islamists, such as one group led by a former Erdogan economy minister. Prominent opposition figures with links to the regime include a former prime minister, and a former economy minister, under Erdogan. A turning point during the campaign came when the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) made its support for the National Alliance candidate official. See ibid. 21.
[7]. cf. courrierinternational.com/article/turquie-erdogan-la-chute
[8]. The Republican People’s Party increased its presence in Parliament by 23 seats from 146 to 169.
[9]. Cf. M. Ricci Sargentini, “Erdogan vince ancora in Turchia…”, op. cit.
[10]. Although nearly two million voters did not return to the polls for the runoff, the turnout was still remarkable (84 percent). Cf. G. Colarusso, “Erdogan vince ancora…”, op. cit.
[11]. L. Caracciolo, “La Turchia di Erdogan, vent’anni di equilibrismi per restaurare l’Impero”, in la Repubblica, November 5, 2022.
[12]. Cf. G. Colarusso, “Un mese fa il terremoto: 52 mila i morti tra Turchia e Siria”, in la Repubblica, March 7, 2023.
[13]. Ibid.
[14]. Cf. “La Turchia al bivio”, in Internazionale, May 12, 2023, 19. Some analysts gauged the devaluation at over 60 percent: cf. R. Pecori, “La Turchia non tornerà in Occidente”, in Domino 5 (2023) 36.
[15]. See “Ahead of a critical election Turkey’s economy is running on borrowed time”, in The Economist, March 26, 2023.
[16]. Cf. G. Colarusso, “Un mese fa il terremoto…”, op. cit.
[17]. Cf. E. Franceschini, “Terremoto in Turchia, se Erdoğan si scopre vulnerabile”, in la Repubblica, February 8, 2023.
[18]. That is, the followers of Imam Fethullah Gülen, who, Erdogan believes, was the real mastermind of the failed 2016 coup. The imam has been living in the United States for a long time.
[19]. Cf. “Turkey could be on the brink of dictatorship”, in The Economist, January 19, 2023.
[20]. L. Caracciolo, “La Turchia di Erdogan, vent’anni di equilibrismi per restaurare l’Impero”, op. cit.
[21]. Berlin and Washington are trying to convince Ankara and Athens to submit certain disputes over the Aegean islands to the judgment of the International Court in The Hague. Cf. T. Mastrobuoni, “Nell’eterno scontro tra greci e turchi spunta il piano di pace su gas e isole dell’Egeo”, in la Repubblica, May 26, 2023.
[22]. According to political scientist Daniele Santoro, Erdogan’s conquest of Tripolitania constitutes evidence of a momentous strategic shift on Turkey’s part, being “the symptom of a formidable revolution in the Turks’ approach to the sea, even the hint of a disruption in the relationship between land and water. Indeed, the Libyan conquest had a predominantly maritime dimension, was crowned with success only because of decisive Turkish superiority in the waters between Anatolia and North Africa” (D. Santoro, “La Turchia punta a dominare il Mare Nostrum”, in Limes, no. 8, 2022, 134).
[23]. Cf. D. Quirico, “Il ritorno del sultano”, in La Stampa, July 19, 2022.
[24]. Cf. “Ahead of a critical election Turkey’s economy is running on borrowed time”, op. cit.
[25]. Cf. R. Bongiorni, “Turchia, economia e terremoto: per Erdogan le elezioni più difficili di sempre”, in Il Sole 24 Ore, April 27, 2023.
[26]. According to the World Bank, it was financially heterodox policies that “intensified the internal and external vulnerabilities of the Turkish economy.” Erdogan imposed continuous cuts on the Central Bank, sending inflation soaring above 40 percent, convinced that cheap money would boost exports, domestic investment, and thus increase growth. This has not been the case. Cf. G. Colarusso, “Tra i turchi divisi al voto. Ecco l’uomo che potrebbe sconfiggere Erdogan”, in La Repubblica, April 26, 2023.
[27]. Cf. R. Bongiorni, “Economia e terremoto…”, op. cit.
[28]. Cf. G. Colarusso, “Fronte verde contro Erdogan”, in la Repubblica – Il venerdì, April 7, 2023, 22.
[29]. According to some observers, refugees in Turkey are better off than those hosted in other Middle Eastern countries. Syrians have access to public health care, education and a pathway to citizenship. See “Who are the Syrian Democratic Forces?”, in The Economist, January 19, 2023.
[30]. The proposal, made by Turkey two years ago to the Israeli government, to demarcate their respective exclusive maritime zones in the Mediterranean Sea allows Ankara to legitimize in an important and irreversible way the so-called “blue homeland doctrine”; on the other hand, it allows the Jewish state to greatly extend its maritime sovereignty. Cf. D. Santoro, “Ankara e Gerusalemme condannate a piacersi”, in Limes, no. 3, 2023, 203.
[31]. Cf. D. Raineri, “Curdi, Stato Islamico e armeni: i nemici trasversali di Erdogan”, in la Repubblica, November 14, 2022.
[32]. Cf. R. Castelletti, “Patto d’affari tra Erdogan e Putin, ma sulla Siria il Cremlino frena”, in la Repubblica, August 6, 2022.
[33]. “Turkey has a newly confrontational foreign policy”, in The Economist, January 16, 2023.
[34]. Cf. F. Rossi, “Erdogan gioca d’azzardo”, in L’Espresso, October 30, 2022, 72. Recall that at the urging of NATO, Erdogan has sent a lot of drones to Ukraine, which have been useful on the war front.
[35]. Ibid.
[36]. “Turkey has a new confrontational foreign policy”, op. cit.
[37]. “Turkey’s trade ties with China and Russia pale in comparison to those with Europe. The EU is Ankara’s main trading partner, just as America is Turkey’s main arms supplier” (“Turkey has a new confrontational foreign policy”, op. cit.). Let us not forget that Ankara relies on contributions from Western countries for reconstruction after the earthquake. Cf. F. Casarotto, “Turchia e americani, insieme (per ora)”, in Domino 5 (2023) 121.
[38]. Although, apparently, these goods manage to reach their destination by another route, through Turkey itself.
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