In 1622 Pope Gregory XV created Propaganda Fide. This Roman congregation was tasked with keeping the mission of evangelization away from political control, as had occurred under the Padroado system.[1] It was also a way for the Church to regain control of the fundamental mission of evangelization, which was by this stage established as universal and supranational. This mission was thus to be exercised without distinction of nationality. This specific character of the mission of evangelization was in line with the international norms of the 19th century, which guaranteed, among other things, the independence of Christian missions. Indeed, the international law of the time required the protection and promotion of all religious activities without distinction of nationality or worship.[2] But could this principle of the universality and supranationality of missions hold up in the face of the nationalism and political vision of European states?
In this article, we aim to show, on the one hand, how the organization of missions in the context of colonization in Africa was a Trojan horse within indications of international law and, on the other hand, how the winds of nationalism and hostilities between European states, particularly Germany and France, changed and determined the mission of evangelization in the former German colonies in Africa (Togo, Cameroon) during the first half of the 20th century.
Nationalization of Missions: Church Realpolitik?
By the early 20th century, apart from Ethiopia and Liberia, Africa had been colonized by European nations. Around 1890 the conquests were almost complete, and the colonial map of Africa was already more or less drawn. In this context of colonization, one fact has caught historians’ attention: Although the mission of evangelization was supposed to take place without distinction of nationality, mission lands on the continent had essentially been “nationalized.” The Missionary Charter of Africa (1912)[3] testifies that national preference seems to have been the rule that determined the identity of missionaries who were to work in the colonies. Then again, the colonizers had campaigned for missionaries to be their compatriots.[4] This is how congregations of French origin were installed in the French colonies: the Congregation of the Holy Spirit (Senegal, Guinea, Gabon), the Society of African Missions (Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger), the Society of Missionaries of Africa (Algeria, Western Sudan), the Congregation of the Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny (Senegal). In the German colonies, we meet the German Missionaries of the Society of the Divine Word (Togo) and the Pallottines (Cameroon). In the English colonies, the mission was entrusted mainly to the Mill Hill Fathers.[5] In the Belgian Congo, King Leopold II had insisted on having Belgian missionaries in his colony. In the Portuguese colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Cabo Verde), most of the missionaries came from the metropolitan territory. To the Italian colonies (Eritrea, Italian Somalia, Libya) were sent the Daughters of St. Anne, the Pious Mothers of Nigrizia, Trinitarian missionaries, Capuchins and Italian Franciscans.
These arrangements had their advantages. For European nations, the strategy of preferring national missionaries allowed for real political influence in the colonies and the exclusive dissemination of a national culture of European origin. The mission of evangelization thus became a political tool at the service of the colonizing nations. Faced with this way of doing things, which ultimately transposed the conflicts of European nationalism to Africa, the Church played the card of political realism. The most important thing for the Church, in fact, was the proclamation of the Gospel. Thus in practicing realpolitik, it had not opposed the policy of preferring national missionaries in the colonies. Besides, this also yielded advantages for the mission. This method promoted a certain tranquility and cooperation between the missionaries and the colonial administration. It facilitated the grants of land and other favors. In Europe, national preference stimulated the interest and financial support of the missions entrusted to their compatriots. This was seen as a national duty for the colonies’ mother countries. However, if during the Belle Époque the national approach to the missions posed no difficulty, with World War I the situation changed radically.
World War I and the Missions in the German Colonies
On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, leading into World War I. At first, conflict was localized in Europe. After all, in the aftermath of the outbreak of war, Berlin reassured the colonies, “The Great Powers are endeavoring, in order to preserve peace in Europe, to limit the war between Austria and Serbia to the local level. You can reassure your administrations: our protectorates remain outside the risk of war.”[6] But this message from Wilhelm Solf, then secretary of state for the colonies, was based on an illusion. The Germans, who rejoiced at the advance of the imperial army in Europe, did not imagine that the war would come to Africa as well. Now, “the tragic outcome in the war unleashed by the nationalist passions of the peoples of Europe could not remain confined there without dragging their peripheral possessions into catastrophe.”[7] As the conflict continued in Europe, London and Paris told their colonies to prepare for war.[8]
About a week after the war began, Cameroon was the first battlefield in Africa. On August 5, 1914, a military column from the French colony of Chad began hostilities. Despite German resistance, Cameroon fell to the Allies on February 18, 1916, after about 18 months of fighting. On August 6, 1914, it was the turn of Togo. Attacks came from the Gold Coast in the west, Dahomey in the east and Upper Volta in the north. Not having an army like Cameroon, Togo’s fate was resolved in three weeks. On August 26, 1914, the Germans capitulated. On August 8, 1914, German territory in East Africa[9] was the scene of fighting. Because this region was of strategic significance and possessed important strengths due to its resources and geographical location, German resistance was stronger. The fighting lasted the entire period of the war. Armed combat ended only with the cease-fire in Europe (November 11, 1918). In German Southwest Africa, present-day Namibia, the war did not begin until January 1915, and ended six months later, on July 5, 1915.[10] The war in Europe had thus not spared the colonies. Everywhere in Africa the Germans were defeated, an outcome with substantial repercussions.
On the political level, the Germans had de facto lost their colonies, and were expelled even before the end of the war. On the religious level, since, according to international law, religious missions were to be favored and protected regardless of nationality, missionaries normally would not have to worry. In Togo, for example, after the capitulation of the Germans, it had been decided that German missionaries should stay and continue their activities as usual. But given nationalist interests and Franco-German hostility at the time, would the new French occupiers tolerate the presence of German missionaries?
As missiologist Marc Spindler points out, the German missionaries had every reason to believe that they were safe and could continue their activities. But this was not the case. German nationality had become a cause, if not “the” cause for restrictive measures, bans and eventually expulsion.[11] In Togo, this was made even clearer in a message sent by Commandant Libersart to the superior of the mission in Aného: “Please be persuaded that the legitimate surveillance measures taken by the local authority against the fathers of the Catholic mission in Togo in no way concern the religion of which they are priests or their ecclesiastical character, respected by all, but only their nationality.”[12]
Apparently, the missionary identity of the fathers had not prevented them from being regarded as religious: they were seen only as Germans, and not as missionaries, bearers of a supranational mission that deserved protection without distinction of nationality. In Cameroon, on November 7, 1914, possibly stricken by the shock of the war situation, Msgr. Heinrich Vieter died of a heart attack. His coadjutor, Msgr. Franz Hennemann,[13] who was to replace him, was in Germany at the time. Father Hoegen was therefore appointed provicar, pending Msgr. Hennemann’s return. But because he was German, General Aymerich, commander of the French troops, refused to recognize his legitimacy,[14] forcing him to cede his authority to the French military chaplain, Father Jules Douvry.[15] The missionaries’ German identity was ultimately the sufficient cause for their expulsion.
In a message to the French Minister of Colonies, Goullet wrote, “In order to establish an exclusively French influence in Togo, it would be advantageous to obtain immediately from the ecclesiastical authority the replacement of all German religious personnel currently present in French Togo with French missionaries.”[16] Therefore, even before the war ended and a peace conference decided the fate of the German colonies, the French were already considering the de-germanization of the German colonies.
Consequences for the Missions
In early 1916, German missionaries were expelled from Cameroon. In late 1917 and early 1918, it was the turn of German missionaries in Togo. These expulsions came as a shock to Christians. They could not understand why, because of nationalism and conflicts between European states, missions in Africa were being deprived of missionaries, Mass, sacraments and teachings. In Cameroon, Catholics could not help but wonder, “If all missionaries are first and foremost Catholic, why did the French drive out the German missionaries?”[17] In other words, could not the Catholic mission, because of its universal and supranational character, cross national borders? Catholics did not imagine that Europeans could wage war on each other in this way, even at home.
The departure of missionaries created a vacuum among Catholics and destabilized missionary activities. The missions needed to be reorganized. In the time between the departure of the German missionaries and the arrival of the French missionaries, there had been a decline in mission activity. The consequences were material and spiritual. Schools, churches, rectories were abandoned and buildings fell into disrepair. The defection of some catechists was detrimental to the evolution of Christian communities. The faith of Catholics was weakening, and some even returned to traditional religions; others fell into vice and ended up leading a life contrary to Christian doctrine.
However, some catechists remained faithful to their task. Their work was essential to maintain and animate religious life in some Catholic communities. Moreover, the deteriorating mission situation in the former German colonies could not remain that way. Once the war was over (1918), it was necessary to rethink the mission. Therefore, all eyes were turned toward Paris, where a peace conference was being organized, which was to decide, among other things, the fate of the German colonies.
The Treaty of Versailles and the German Missions
On January 18, 1919, a peace conference opened in Paris. Its main purpose was to discuss and establish the conditions for a lasting peace. It had gathered the victors (the Allies) and the vanquished (the Germans) around the table. Because of its unresolved relationship with the Kingdom of Italy (the Roman Question), the Holy See was not admitted to the conference where the fate of the German colonies was being decided. Since the political situation had serious consequences for evangelization activities, the Holy See followed the negotiations closely. On March 25, 1919, just two months after the conference began, Cardinal von Hartmann, alarmed by the danger facing the German missions, wrote to Pope Benedict XV on behalf of the bishops of the Fulda Bishops’ Conference, to warn him. At the same time, he asked for the pope’s intervention so that the German missions would not be affected by the political situation.[18]
On May 19, 1919, Berger[19] also sent a letter to the pope, asking for his good offices in the face of the looming decline of the German missions and the consequences this might have on German Catholicism.[20] On the same day, the leaders of the German Missionary Society of St. Francis Xavier also sent a message to the pope, asking him to intervene so that German missionaries could continue to “collaborate in the fulfillment of Christ’s work of redemption within the universal mission of the Church.”[21] In addition to these appeals, the Munich nunciature also received requests from the German government on behalf of not only the missionaries but also German civilians.[22] Letters from German missionaries threatened with expulsion were arriving in Rome. All these appeals were, for the most part, motivated by two articles drafted during the peace conference: articles 122 and 438.
Article 122 gave the Allied governments the power to expel Germans from occupied territories if they deemed it necessary. Article 438, for its part, called for the assets of German missions to be entrusted to boards of directors, appointed or approved by the governments and composed of persons belonging to the Christian religion.[23]
These articles, thus formulated, carried certain risks. Regarding Article 122, Germans were in danger of no longer being able to participate in the Church’s universal mission in some regions because of their nationality. In that case, the Church would have had to try to provide missionaries to five vicariates and seven apostolic prefectures, to replace German missionaries in missions where their nationality would pose a problem. One may surmise that the Church would not wish to see its right to send whoever it wished to missions anywhere in the world restricted.
As for Article 438, the risk was that the assets of Catholic missions would end up in the hands of Protestants.” Boards of administration could also be composed of non-Catholic Christians. This would have reduced, or even nullified, the Catholic Church’s evangelization efforts, not to mention that the assets involved came from the efforts of Catholics.
As these articles tended to impede the evangelizing mission of the Church, the Holy See sent Msgr. Cerretti, then secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, to Paris.[24] On May 26, 1919, he went to Paris with a memorandum from Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State, which analyzed in detail the articles in question, showing the danger they posed to the universal and supranational mission of the Church.
Unable to participate in the discussions, Msgr. Cerretti decided the appropriate tactic was persuasion, meeting one by one with the delegates of the nations, explaining to them what was at stake in the question of the German missions and the legitimacy of the Holy See’s interest in the missions. He did not take leave of his interlocutors without first handing each of them a copy of the memorandum. Msgr. Cerretti’s mission was to convince the Allied Powers in order to obtain the cancellation or modification of the articles and the possibility for German missionaries to remain and continue their mission in the former German colonies.[25] But, realizing that he could not get anything done about Article 122, Msgr. Cerretti concentrated his efforts on getting Article 438 amended. He urged the delegates, especially those favorable to the Church, that the draft article be revised. In the end, he succeeded in obtaining the desired result: the board of administration of the properties would no longer be composed of people belonging to the Christian religion, but of people of the same faith as the mission and properties in question.
This change was interpreted as a great success. But could the German missionaries, who were prevented from returning to their missions, view favorably Cerretti’s mission? An analysis of the facts leads to the conclusion that it was only half a success. Indeed, fearing that the Catholic missions and their assets would end up in the hands of Protestants, Msgr. Cerretti’s efforts succeeded in securing the assets of the missions and that the boards of administration remained Catholic. But he had failed to ensure that the missions remained in the hands of German missionary societies. Sent to Paris to save the German missions, Msgr. Cerretti had only been able to save the Catholic missions in general. His efforts thus failed to provide a satisfactory solution to the concerns of the German missionaries, who could only dream of returning to their missions. And in such a situation, was it not reasonable to foresee the possibility that they would now be removed from the missionary activity of the Church?
The major superiors of German religious congregations had not given up. They protested against the Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919. In fact, it no longer allowed them access to the missions of the former German colonies. Faced with this state of affairs, they asked the Holy See for help so that their missionaries could return to their missions. But despite the Holy See’s efforts, no positive results were achieved. Forced by the new situation, Propaganda Fide withdrew the missions from the German missionaries and entrusted them to French and English missionaries. Togo was thus entrusted to the Society of African Missions. In Cameroon, the French part was entrusted to the Spiritan and Dehonian fathers (of French and Belgian origin), and the English-speaking part to the Mill Hill Fathers.
German Missionary Societies had also made attempts to engage directly with the new authorities in their former missions. In Togo, the leaders of the Society of the Divine Word had approached the African Mission Society. The new Vicar Apostolic of Togo, Msgr. Cessou, faced with the scope of the mission, the challenges of evangelization and the problem of insufficient missionary personnel, had also taken steps to cooperate with the German missionaries of the Society of the Divine Word. But, fearing compromising their relations with the French government and considering that such collaboration would have serious repercussions for the mission and their institute, the authorities of the Society of African Missions had been unwilling to engage in such an undertaking.[26] Thus, even the efforts of the Society of the Divine Word had not succeeded in bringing the German missionaries back to Togo. This situation did not remain without consequences for the mission, which ultimately did not have a rapid resumption of evangelization. The spiritual and material ruins caused by the departure of the German missionaries were not easy to repair. But gradually, although it took time, the new missionaries were able to raise the missions from their ruinous state and continue the work of evangelization.
World War I was a tragedy in all respects. It brought conflict between peoples and interrupted the momentum of Christian missions. This experience was important as the Church became aware of the danger of its strategy of nationalizing missions. This foundational experience led to two resolutions: the reaffirmation of the universality and supranationality of missions through mission autonomy and the training of indigenous clergy. Supranationality thus became a solid foundation against imperialism based on European nationalism.[27]
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32009/22072446.0524.11
[1]. The Padroado (“Patronage”) was a complex of privileges granted by the Holy See to the king of Portugal beginning in the 15th century.
[2]. Cf. Article 6 of the Berlin Conference, at http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/traites/
1885berlin.htm /; Articles 1 and 2 of the Brussels Act (1890), in Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Conférence internationale de Bruxelles, 18 novembre 1889 – 2 juillet 1890. Protocoles et acte final, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1891, 476 f.
[3]. Cf. J.-M. Vasquez, La cartographie missionnaire en Afrique. Science, religion et conquête (1870-1930), Paris, Karthala, 2011.
[4]. Berlin had explicitly requested that missionaries in the German colonies be of German nationality. Cf. Historical Archives of the Secretariat of State – Section for Relations with States and International Organizations, Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs Archive (ASRS, AA.EE.SS.), Leo XIII, Germany II, Pos. 1364, fasc. 764, ff. 19 -19rv.
[5]. There were also other foreign-born congregations in the English colonies, as England had been more liberal. This is also explained by the small number of English missionary societies.
[6]. Cf. Y. Marguerat, La guerre de 1914 au Togo et ses conséquences. Histoire militaire, histoire politique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2019, 34.
[7]. M. Michel, L’Afrique dans l’engrenage de la Grande Guerre (1914-1918), Paris, Karthala, 2013, 9 f.
[8]. Cf. F. J. Moberly, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: Military operations, Togoland and the Cameroons (1914-1916), London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1931, 13; Y. Marguerat, La guerre de 1914 au Togo et ses conséquences…, op. cit., 36.
[9]. This German colonial territory consisted of Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.
[10]. Cf. A. J.-P. Savi, Échec géopolitique et échec missionnaire? Les missionnaires catholiques allemands au Togoland (1892-1921), Paris, L’Harmattan, 2020, 111; I. Scheele, “La Première Guerre mondiale au Cameroun: une guerre des archives?”, in Cahier d’études germaniques 66 (2014) 231.
[11]. Cf. M. Spindler, “Les missions allemandes 1914-1939. Liquidation et résilience”, in G. Vidal et Al. (eds), L’Allemagne missionnaire d’une guerre à l’autre (1914-1939): effondrement et résilience, Paris, Karthala, 2017, 24.
[12]. “Libersart au supérieur de la mission d’Aného”, Aného, November 18, 1915, in Archives générales de la Société du Verbe Divin, Regio Togoensis 903.
[13]. He was ordained bishop coadjutor to Msgr. Vieter on April 26, 1914, in Douala. After his episcopal ordination, he had traveled to Germany to say goodbye to his parents and friends. Because of the war, he was unable to return to Cameroon. He would later be sent to South Africa as bishop of Cape Town in 1922. Cf. P. Laburthe-Tolra, “Pallottins allemands et Spiritains français face aux danses et aux instruments de musique en pays Beti (Cameroun), 1890-1950”, in Mémoire Spiritaine 10 (1999) 96.
[14]. Cf. J.-P. Messina, Des témoins camerounais de l’évangile. André Kwa Mbange, Pius Otu, Joseph Zoa, Yaoundé, Presses de l’Ucac, 1998, 30.
[15]. Cf. J.-P. Messina – J. Van Slageren, Histoire du christianisme au Cameroun. Des origines à nos jours, Paris, Karthala, 2005, 152 f.
[16]. “Goullet au Ministre des colonies”, Dakar, 11 août 1916, in Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer, TGO 6.
[17]. S. Eyezoo, “L’expulsion des missionnaires allemands du Cameroun pendant la première guerre mondiale à travers la correspondance des Pères français Barreau et Hermann”, in Mémoire Spiritaine 21 (2005) 120.
[18]. Cf. “De Hartmann à Benoît XV”, Cologne, March 25, 1919, in ASRS, AA.EE.SS, Africa-Asia-Oceania, 1918-1922, Pos. 86, fasc. 59, ff. 69 -71rv.
[19]. He was president of the Section for the Propagation of the Faith in Institutes of Higher Education in Germany.
[20]. Cf. “Berg à Benoît XV”, Aachen, May 15, 1919, in ASRS, AA.EE.SS, Africa-Asia-Oceania, 1918-1922, Pos. 86, fasc. 60, ff. 42 -43rr.
[21]. ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Africa-Asia-Oceania, 1918-1922, Pos. 86, fasc. 60, ff. 44 -45rr.
[22]. Cf. “Maglione à Gasparri”, Berne, May 26, 1919, in ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Africa-Asia-Oceania, 1918-1922, Pos. 86, fasc. 62.
[23]. See ASRS, AA.EE.SS., Africa-Asia-Oceania, 1918-1922, Pos. 86, fasc. 60, f. 26r.
[24]. Indeed, the issues related to the German missions offered an opportunity for the Holy See to make its voice heard, despite not being admitted to membership of the peace conference. Overall, Msgr. Cerretti had a threefold mission: to defend the Holy See’s interests so that its international position would be defined, to save the German Catholic missions in the former German colonies by obtaining amendments to Articles 122 and 438, and to safeguard the interests of the Catholic Church in the former Ottoman Empire in the midst of Balkanization. Cf. Y. Chiron, Benoît XV. Le pape et la paix, Paris, Perrin, 2014, 239 f; G. M. Croce, “Le Saint-Siège et la conférence de paix (1919). Diplomatie de l’Église et diplomaties d’État”, in Mélanges de l’École française de Rome 109 (1997/2) 810.
[25]. Cf. V. De Marco, “L’intervento della Santa Sede a Versailles in favore delle missioni tedesche”, in G. Rumi, Benedetto XV e la pace, 1918, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1990, 69.
[26]. Cf. “Réunion du conseil (1926-1937)”, in Archives de la Société des Missions africaines (Ama), 2H20, f. 19; Rapport annuel (1926-1927), AMA 25, 18 f.
[27]. Cf. C. Prudhomme, “La mission du XXe siècle: triomphe, crise et mutations du côté catholique en particulier à travers l’exemple des Spiritains”, in Histoire et Missions chrétiennes 10 (2009/2) 10.